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The  performance of  conventional methodologies used  to estimate and
describe flows  in  the  international  wheat  market has  been mixed.  An
alternative approach is  one  which  incorporates importers'  loyalty and
probabilities  of  switching purchases between exporters.  An  application of  the
Markov  model  is  used  in  this  study  to  explain trade flows  and analyze  importer
loyalty.  Results  show  that in  most  cases switching between wheats from
different exporters is  not symmetrical.
Both  the  United States and Argentina have  strong import loyalty  in
world trade,  but  both are vulnerable to  market share erosion.  Unless
significant changes are instituted, the  United States'  market share will
gradually decline,  Canada's will  remain constant,  and that for the  EC,
Argentina,  and Australia will  increase.
vIMPORTER LOYALTY  IN INTERNATIONAL WHEAT MARKETS
William  W.  Wilson,  Won  W.  Koo,  and  Colin  A.  Carter*
The  wheat  market  has  been  the  focus  of  numerous  studies  because  of  its
importance  in  international  agricultural  trade.  The  majority  of  these  studies
have  modeled  trade  flows  in  the  world  wheat  market  assuming  perfect
substitutability  between  wheats  across  origins  and  either  a  competitive  or
imperfectly  competitive  market  structure.  In  this  paper,  trade  flows  in  the
international  wheat  market  are  studied  utilizing  a  different  approach.  Wheat
is  not  treated  as  a  homogeneous  commodity,  nor  are  a  priori  assumptions  made
regarding  market  competitiveness.  An  application  of  the  Markov  model
developed  by  Telser  is  used  to  estimate  trade  flows  and  to  characterize  wheat
importer's  demand  loyalty  to  individual  exporters.  This  approach  provides
estimates  of  market  share  transition  probabilities,  and  the  results  provide
insight into  the  characteristics  of  competition  in  the  international  wheat
market.  The  working  hypothesis  is  that  institutional  and  trade  relationships,
strategies  by  exporters  and  importers,  and  quality  differentials  all  influence
trade  flows  and  result  in  wheat  being  differentiated  by  country  of  origin.
The  nature  of  competition  in  the  wheat  market  is  such  that  relative
prices  across  exporters  are  fairly  constant  over  extended  time  periods.  There
are,  however,  a  number  of  factors  that  result  in  imperfect  substitution
between  wheats  of  different  origins  including  long-term  agreements  (LTAs),
credit,  trade  policy,  political  relations,  quality,  and  reliability  of  supply.
There  are  three  important  motivations  for  this  paper.  The  first  is
that  there  have  been  fairly  distinct  efforts  by  exporters  and  importers  to
influence  individual  import  market  shares  and  their  stability.  The  most
recent  agricultural  policy  developments  in  the  1985  United  States  Farm  Bill
contain  export  enhancement  provisions  that  are  designed  to  increase  the  United
States'  market  shares  in  selected  markets.  A better  understanding  of
importers'  loyalty  to  suppliers  and  switching  potential  would  be  useful  in
assessing  the  effectiveness  of  these  types  of  programs.  Given  the  different
types  of  wheat  traded  and  the  politics  of  the  grain  trade,  importers  may
transfer  purchases  from  one  supplier  to  another  even  when  relative  prices  are
unchanged.
The  second  motivation  is  that  while  aggregate  market  shares  of  all
wheat  exports  by  any  one  exporting  nation  have  been  relatively  constant  (with
the  exception  of  France),  shares  of  specific  markets  have  been  much  more
volatile.  The  coefficient  of  variation  for  the  United  States'  market  share
(1960  to  1984)  in  world  wheat  trade  was  11.8  to  all  destinations  but  was  37.6,
142.2,  61.4,  and  104.9  to  the  major  markets  in  Algeria,  China,  Japan,  and
USSR,  respectively.  Such  differences  suggest  that  competition  in  selected
importing  countries  is  quite  dynamic,  which  would  not  be  apparent  from
aggregate  market  shares.  In  addition,  the  variability  of  shares  in  selected
markets  is  substantially  different  from  exporter  to  exporter.
*Wilson  and  Koo  are  associate  professor  and  professor,  North  Dakota
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The  third  motivation  is  that  traditional  approaches  for  predicting
trade  flows  have  been  less  than  satisfactory.  Estimated  trade  matrices
normally  contain  far  fewer  trades  than  actually  occur.  This  suggests  that
factors  influencing  trade  flows  must  be  of  greater  complexity  than  can  be
incorporated  into  traditional  trade  models.  This  study  was  conducted  as  an
alternative  approach  to  explaining  trade  flows  and  provides  a  description  of
buyer-seller  interrelationships  with  an  emphasis  on  import  loyalty  and
switching.
Background
There  has  been  an  extensive  debate  in  the  literature  regarding  the
structure  of  the  international  wheat  market,  the  formation  of  world  wheat
prices  and  trade  flows,  and  the  price  elasticity  of  foreign  demand.  In  an
early  paper  by  McCalla,  international  wheat  trade  was  modeled  as  being
oligopolistic.  He  suggested  that  the  market  was  a  cooperative  duopoly
comprised  of  Canada  and  the  United  States  with  a  fringe  of  competitive
followers.  Canada  was  postulated  to  be  the  price  leader.  Subsequently,
Alaouze  et  al.  hypothesized  a  triopoly  model  with  Australia  added  as  a  third
member  to  McCalla's  model. 1  Grennes  and  Johnson  argued  that  the  oligopoly
model  is  not  a  useful  description  of  the  international  wheat  market.  Rather,
they  suggest  the  market  can  be  modeled  as  being  competitive,  and  government
barriers,  such  as  tariffs  and  quotas,  can  be  introduced  into  the  competitive
framework.  Carter  and  Schmitz  hypothesized  that  importers,  rather  than
exporters,  exerted  market  power  in  the  wheat  market.  They  argued  that
importers  depress  both  international  prices  and  trade  flows  through  the  use  of
import  trade  barriers.  The  monopsony  behavior  of  importers  was  supported  by  a
subsequent  study  that  analyzed  the  European  Economic  Community's  grain  buying
behavior  (Sampson  and  Snape).  A description  of  the  current  structural
competitive  environment,  as  well  as  the  history,  is  provided  in  Wilson.  In
that  paper,  the  world  wheat  market  is  depicted  with  the  United  States  as  the
dominant  form  and  all  other  exporters  as  members  of  the  competitive  fringe,
which  price  their  exports  so  as  to  minimize  stockholding.
One  of  the  purposes  of  many  trade  models  is  to  explain  trade  flows
between  exporters  and  importers.  An  extensive  review  by  Thompson  indicated
that  spatial  price  equilibrium  models  performed  poorly  in  explaining  trade
flows.  More  recently,  Kolstad  and  Burris  supported  Thompson  and  illustrate
that  predicted  trade  flows  from  a  competitive  spatial  price  equilibrium  model
were  not  very  accurate  in  comparison  to  actual  trade  flows.  Argentina,
Australia,  and  the  European  Community  (EC)  each  were  predicted  by  the  spatial
1The  primary  motivation  for  the  McCalla  and  Alaouze  et  al.
characterization  of  the  wheat  market  as  being  oligopolistic  was  presumably
that  the  United  States,  Canada,  and  Australia  had  large  export  market  shares
and  were  willing  and  able  to  hold  stocks.  However,  in  recent  years  both
Canada  and  Australia  have  dramatically  reduced  their  stockholding.  This
implies  a  market  structure  in  which  the  United  States  acts  as  the  price  leader
(through  the  operation  of  the  price  support  program)  and  all  other  exporters
behave  as  the  competitive  fringe,  pricing  exports  sufficiently  below  the
United  States  to  minimize  ending  stocks.-3-
model  to  export  to  only  one  importer,  but  they  actually  exported  to  many.
Similar  inconsistencies  were  observed  from  results  assessing  various  forms  of
imperfect  competition.  Comparisons  revealed  that  the  assumption  of
Nash-duopsony  conduct  provided  a  very  poor  explanation  of  trade  flows.
The  responsiveness  of  foreign  wheat  import  demand  to  both  economic  and
political  variables  has  important  policy  implications  for  wheat  exporting
nations.  Past  research  efforts  (see  survey  papers  by  Thompson,  Abbott,
Sarris,  and  Gardiner  and  Dixit)  aimed  at  modeling  wheat  import  demand  have  had
mixed  results,  and  elasticity  estimates  have  varied  greatly  depending  on
specification,  assumptions,  and  scope  of  analysis.  Some  studies  (Grennes,
Johnson,  and  Thursby)  have  argued  that  the  import  demand  for  United  States
wheat  is  highly  elastic.  Others  (Abbott;  Bredahl,  Meyers,  and  Collins;  Zwart
and  Meilke)  have  estimated  the  elasticity  of  import  demand  facing  United
States'  wheat  exports  to  be  low.  Konandreas,  Bushnell,  and  Green  found  that
concessional  sales  substitute  for  commercial  sales,  and  that  import  price
elasticities  ranged  across  regions  from  very  inelastic  to  very  elastic.  Capel
and  Rigaux  also  found  widely  different  elasticities,  many  of  which  were  not
significantly  different  from  zero.  The  weak  import  response  to  price
suggested  the  importance  of  nonprice  variables  and  political  influences  on
import  decisions.
There  are  a number  of  nonprice  factors  which  influence  market  shares.
Exporters  have  made  distinct efforts  to  differentiate  their  wheat  and  increase
import  loyalty,  while  importers  have  attempted  to  diversify  across  suppliers.
One  response  by  nearly  all  exporters  has  been  to  participate  in  long-term
bilateral  agreements  (LTAs).  The  purpose  of  increasing  LTA  sales  from  an
exporter's  perspective  is  to  create  import  loyalty,  whereas  importers  seek
security  and  diversification.  Canada  has  used  LTAs  more  than  other  exporters,
and  the  United  States  has  limited  agreements  only  with  the  USSR  and  China. 2
The  use  of  credit  for  export  sales  has  been  an  important  component  of  the
United  States'  competitive  strategy  (International  Wheat  Council).  The
proportion  of  sales  from  the  United  States  under  credit  programs  increased
from  14  percent  in  1981/82  to  40  percent  in  1982/83.  Other  exporters  have
used  credit only  to  a  limited  extent.
Nearly  all  previous  studies  on  wheat  competition  recognize  the
potential  importance  of  quality  differentials  across  wheat  exporters,  but  most
have  ultimately  conducted  empirical  analyses  assuming  homogeneity.  For
example,  Konandreas  and  Hurtado  indicated  that  "price  differentials  explain
only  part  of  the  trade  flows  among  countries,  whereas  traditional  trade
patterns,  quality  preferences,  and  institutional  and  political  factors
explain,  we  believe,  the  most"  (pp.  11-12).  Hurtado  indicated  that  import
market  shares  do  not  respond  to  changes  in  relative  price  as  "if  importers
were  totally  indifferent  regarding  the  grain  from  different  sources."
2 A  recent  study  by  VanAmberg  analyzed  the  effect of  LTAs  on  world  wheat
trade  flows.  He  found  that  due  to  LTAs  many  nonoptimal  trade  flows  existed
and  Canada  was  able  to  maintain  higher  market  shares  in  some  markets  than
would  exist under  an  unconstrained  trade  flow.-4-
At  least  a  part  of  these  observations  emanate  from  quality  differences
across  wheat  exports.  Each  exporter  produces  different  types  of  wheat
(normally  delineated  by  color,  protein,  hardness,  and  planting  period)  and  has
different  systems  for  export  quality  standards.  In  addition,  there  are  a
multitude  of  end  uses  including  bread,  pasta,  crackers,  cakes,  breakfast  food,
and  animal  feed.  Given  the  many  types  of  wheat  produced  and  end-use  products,
the  degree  of  substitutability  should  vary  across  countries.  In  some  cases,
due  to  highly  specialized  wheat  products,  substitutability  is  limited,  but  in
other  uses  substitutability  may  approach  being  perfect.  Thus,  the  quality  of
wheat,  though  generally  constant  through  time,  should  be  expected  to  play  an
important  role  in  the  world  wheat  trade  and  can  be  incorporated  in  an
empirical  analysis  to  some  extent  by  distinguishing  the  origin.
Coinciding  with  the  evolving  competitive  environment  of  exporters,  some
importers'  purchasing  decisions  have  been  influenced  by  aggregate  trade
policy,  political  ties,  and  selected  strategies  for  diversification.  Several
studies  mentioned  above  indicated  that  political  and  trade  policies  have  had
important  influences  on  trade  flows  in  the  wheat  market.  Selected  recent
examples  include  Japan's  large  trade  surplus  with  the  United  States;  lack  of
most-favored-nation  (MFN)  status  with  several  countries  including  the  USSR;
partial  trade  liberalization  with  China  but  offsetting  United  States
import  constraints  on  textiles;  and  the  entry  of  Britain,  Spain,  and  Portugal
into  the  EC.  All  of  these  influence  trade  flows  in  one  way  or  another
irrespective  of  underlying  economics.
Some  importers  have  also  distinctly  pursued  strategies  of
diversification  among  sources  of  supplies.  There  are  two  potential  reasons
for  importers  to  diversify.  One  is  that  reduced  dependence  on  a  single
least-cost origin  effectively  reduces  the  exposure  to  risk  of  trade-
restricting  events.  Specific  examples  include  climate-  or  policy-induced
production  shortages,  politically  imposed  embargoes,  and  labor  strikes  in
grain  handling  industries.  A  second  motivation  for diversification  is  that  a
prerequisite  to  the  exercise  of  importer  market  power  is  the  availability  of
viable  alternatives.  Without  viable  alternatives  it  would  be  virtually
impossible  for  a  large  importer  to  effectively  wield  market  power.  Thus,  it
is  very  logical  for  larger  importers  to  pursue  strategies  of  longer-term
diversification. 3
Empirical  Model
Most  previous  studies  on  import  demand  for  wheat  have  used  either
direct  demand  or  market  share  models,  and  in  each  the  objective  was  to  test
hypotheses  of  factors  influencing  the  dependent  variable.  In  this  study  the
Markov  model  is  used  to  describe  and  identify  importer  loyalty  and  exporter
competition.  In  general,  the  Markov  model  can  be  applied  to  slightly
heterogeneous  products  which  are  differentiated  by  brand,  or  by  origin  or
3Insel  indicated  that  "Soviet  buying  agents  [Exportkhleb]  are  sensitive
to  their  impact  on  the  market  and  distribute  their  purchases  among  several
sellers."-5-
class  in  our  case.  Consequently,  all  brands  are  potentially  substitutable  and
prices  are  highly  correlated  due  to  the  competitiveness  of  the  market.
Relative  prices  are  fairly  constant  for  extended  time  periods,  and  therefore,
demand  for  particular  brands  should  be  highly  influenced  by  nonprice  factors.
Use  of  the  Markov  model  is  justified  because  importers'  decisions  are  based  on
relative  prices,  quality  characteristics,  diplomatic  relations  among  trading
partners,  strategies  of  buyers  and  sellers,  and  other  factors  discussed  in  the
previous  section.  Price  effects  are  reflected  in  the  error  term,  and
exclusion  of  explicit treatment  is  justified  as  long  as  price  relationships
are  relatively  constant  through  the  time  period  of  the  study--this,  of  course,
is  assured  by  seller-competitive  pressures.
Trade  flows  and  importer  loyalty  in  wheat  are  depicted  in  this  study  by
a  transition  probability  matrix.  Telser  first  used  the  Markov  model  to
estimate  a  transition  probability  matrix,  which  was  used  to  evaluate  brand
loyalty  in  consumer  goods.  Subsequently,  the  Markov  model  has  been  used  in
the  analysis  of  international  trade  (Dent).  The  transition  probability  matrix
is  comprised  of  elements  that  are  conditional  probabilities  of  purchases
being  switched  from  brand  i  in  time  t-1  to  brand  j  in  time  t.  In  our  study,
the  brand  is  defined  as  the  origin  (or  class)  of  wheat  being  imported.  The
following  is  a transition  matrix  for  an  importer  having  n suppliers,  each
representing  a slightly differentiated  type  of  wheat.
Pji
P11 P1 2  *  *  *  Pin
P2 1  P2 2  *  *  *  P2n
n  n2nn
Pnl  Pn2  *  *  *  nn
The  technique used in  this study  to  estimate elements of the  transition
probability matrix is  described in  Appendix A.
Values of  the  diagonal  elements in  P  are  repeat purchase  probabilities
that indicate  the extent of brand  loyalty.  The  element P 11,  for example,
indicates  the  probability of  purchasing brand 1  in  t  given brand 1  was
purchased  in  t-1.  As  Pji(i=j)  approaches  0(1),  less  (more)  loyalty is
exhibited by  importers.  Off-diagonal  elements, Pji(i*j),  are  the
probabilities of  switching  between brands.  For example,  P21 is  the
probability  that given  the  purchase of  1  in  t-1,  that purchase would be
transferred  to 2  in  time  period  t. Telser indicated  that  the elements of  the
matrix are a function  of relative prices,  brand  quality, and  promotion.  In
the  case of  international  wheat  competition,  loyalty is  related  to relative
prices,  reliability  and availability of  supply,  quality, desired
characteristics, exporter  promotion,  institutional  and trade  policy
relationships, and  efforts  by  buyers  to diversify.- 6  -
Important explanations of  trade  behavior are  suggested in comparisons
of  Pji  across brands.  If  Pji  Pij  (iej)  (i.e.,  pairwise  symmetry),  buyers
would be  interpreted as  highly  indifferent between  brands  (or the brands  would
be  highly  substitutable or  competitive).  If  Pji  *  Pij,  then  purchase  flows in
one direction  are  not offset by  those  in  the opposite direction.  If,  for
example,  P12   P 21,  then there  is  a greater probability  of  switching  from 2  to
1  than  from 1  to 2.  If  P12 is  0,  brand  1  is  not substituted  for  brand 2.
With  this  interpretation, results  from  the Markov  model  are  useful  in
identifying  the degree of  homogeneity or  substitutability in  international
wheat trade.  Product characteristics and  international  trade and  political
relations may  preclude  pairwise  symmetry.
Comparison of  the  transitional  probabilities also  indicates the
cumulative  effects  of  competitive  pressures on  exporters.  In  particular,
offsetting probabilities  can  be  compared  to assess  the  vulnerability of an
exporter to  potential  market share  losses.  Individual  elements indicate  from
whom an  exporter would  likely gain  or  to  whom an  exporter would most  likely
lose.  The  horizontal  summation  of  the  elements  indicates  the  cumulative
probability of  gaining, and  the  vertical  summation  indicates  the  cumulative
probability of  losing.  An  exporter is  vulnerable  to  losses  in  market shares
due  to export  competition  if  the  horizontal  sum  is  less  than  the  vertical  sum.
These  comparisons provide a  fairly  useful  means  to  categorize  the
competitiveness  of a particular exporter and  the  sources of  direct
competition.
An  assumption  of  the Markov model  is  that the  implied  underlying
structural  characteristics  of  the  market are stable  when estimating  the
transition  probability  matrix.  This assumption may,  however,  be  violated  for
data  covering  extended time  periods  (e.g.,  25  to  30 years).  One alternative
would  be  to  estimate time-varying  transition  probabilities as a  function of
some  explanatory  variable  (see  Lee,  Judge,  and  Zellner).  However, estimating
time-varying transition  probabilities was  impractical  for  three  reasons.  One
is  that  some  of  the  potential  explanatory  variables  (e.g.,  diplomatic
relations and  trade policies) are  not easily  quantifiable.  Second,  these
variables are generally  not continuous,  and  third,  values for  several  of  the
variables would be  very  constant  over the  time  period.  As  an  alternative,  the
model  was estimated  for  two  relatively  short time  periods encompassing  the
years  1966  to  1984.  Separate  transition  probability  matrices were estimated
using data  for  1966 to  1980 and  from  1970 to  1984 to  assess the  stability of
the transition matrix.  An  F-test against the  null  hypotheses,  Ho:  Pji  (1980)
=  Pji  (1984),  was conducted by  using the  procedure developed by  Chow.
In  addition  to  describing behavior over a long period,  the Markov model
can  be  used  to  forecast market shares  for  individual  exporting countries.  The
market  share  Yj  in  T+1  can  be  estimated  as
Yj(T+1)  =  c  Yi(T)  Pji
i=1
Since  Yi(T) is  the  market share  at  time T and  is known,  the  forecast error is
relatively  small.  However,  for  the  forecast of  Yi  for T+2,  T+3,  ... ,  T+S,  the- 7-
size  of  the  forecast  error  increases  exponentially  because  the  errors
associated  with  Yi(T+i)  are  compounded  for  i=2,  3,  ... ,  S.  The  underlying
assumption  associated  with  these  forecasts  is  that  the  structure  of
competition  remains  constant  over  the  forecast  horizon.
Empirical  Results
The  Markov  model  is  used  here  to  analyze  long-term  purchasing
behavior  by  importers.  Analysis  was  first  conducted  of  an  aggregate  of  all
importers  and  then  by  individually  analyzing  China,  Japan,  and  the  USSR.
These  countries  represent  the  three  largest  wheat  importers  in  recent years.
Algeria  was  chosen  as  a  comparison  because  it  is  the  largest  buyer  of  durum
wheat,  which  is  supplied  almost  exclusively  by  the  United  States  and  Can.ada,
and  because  it  has  been  a  recipient  of  recent  export  enhancement  programs  by
the  United  States.  Imports  into  these  four  countries  are  procured  via  central
buying  agencies,  and  each  country  maintains  some  form  of  an  LTA  with  at  least
one  of  the  major  exporters.  The  time  period  of  the  analysis  was  from  1966  to
1984  (market  years  extend  from  July  to  June),  which  was  a  relatively  stable
structural  competitive  environment  in  the  international  wheat  market.
Separate  models  were  estimated  for  two  periods,  1966  to  1980  and  1970  to  1984,
and  compared  for  statistical  differences.  Data  were  taken  from  various  issues
of  the  International  Wheat  Council's  World  Wheat  Statistics  and  supplemented
with  data  from  the  United  States  Department  of  Agriculture  (Grain  Market  News)
and  unpublished  data  from  the  Canada  Grains  Council.
There  are  important  indigenous  differences  in  the  wheat  produced  by
each  of  the  exporters.  Exports  of  wheat  from  Argentina  are  primarily  hard  red
wheat,  Australia  exports  standard  white,  Canada  exports  hard  red  spring  (CWRS)
and  durum  (CWAD),  France  exports  soft  wheat,  and  the  United  States  exports  a
multitude  of  classes  including  most  of  the  above. 4  The  importers  analyzed  in
this  study  generally  buy  just  one  type  of  wheat  from  each  country  with  the
exception  of  Japan  (e.g.,  the  USSR  buys  HRS  from  Canada  and  HRW  from  the
United  States;  China  buys  CWRS  from  Canada  and  SRW  from  the  United  States).
Thus,  except  in  the  Japanese  market,  the  exporter  was  designated  as  the  brand.
In  each  importing  country  exporters  with  a  substantial  market  share  were
chosen  as  brands  in  an  effort  to  concentrate  on  the  principal  suppliers  and
also  to  conserve  degrees  of  freedom. 5  The  brands  explicitly included  in  each
4The  United  States  grading  system  classifies  wheat  into  five
subclasses:  hard  red  spring  (HRS),  hard  red  winter  (HRW),  soft  red  winter
(SRW),  white, and  durum.  Technically, United  States HRS  is  most comparable  to
Canadian spring  (CWRS),  United States durum  to  that of  Canadian  durum, United
States  HRW is not directly  comparable to  CWRS,  and United  States SRW  is
somewhat comparable  to  that produced  in  the  EC.
5For  every  additional  brand,  one  degree  of  freedom  is  required.  At  the
extreme  of  including  each  export  class  from  each  exporter,  the  number  of
brands  would  exceed  the  number  of  observations.  Further,  because  observations
would  be  equal  to  zero  in  many  cases,  probabilities  generated  for  those  brands
would  equal  zero.-8-
model  were  those  which  were  consistently  a  principal  component  of  the
importers'  purchases.  Those  not  explicitly  included  were  aggregated  in  a
category  referred  to  as  the  ROE  (referring  to  Rest  of  Exporters  following
Telser's  null  brand).  Thus,  the  analysis  was  customized  for  each  country  in
order  to  preserve  degrees  of  freedom.  This  limits  conclusions  that  can  be
made  about  the  very  minor  exporters  but  does  not  limit  conclusions  about  the
characteristics  of  competition  between  major  suppliers.  Results  are  presented
first  for  imports  aggregated  across  all  destinations  (i.e.,  world  trade)  and
then  for  the  individual  countries.
World  Trade  in  Wheat
Historical  market  shares  in  the  world  wheat  trade  are  shown  in  Figure  1,
and  averages  for  the  two  time  periods  are  shown  in  Table  1.  Of  particular
interest  is  that  the  United  States  market  share  is  substantially  greater  than
the  others,  but  also  has  the  least  relative  volatility  as  represented  by  its
coefficient  of  variation.  In  both  time  periods  Australia  and  Argentina  display
substantially  greater  relative  volatility  in  their  market  shares.
TABLE 1.  AVERAGE MARKET SHARES  FOR MAJOR WHEAT  EXPORTERS  IN THE WORLD MARKET
Variable  Mean  Standard Deviation  C.V.
1960  to  1984
Argentina  .05  .025  46.9
Australia  .12  .027  21.4
Canada  .21  .029  14.4
EEC  .10  .035  34.0
United States  .41  .048  11.9
ROE  .10  .045  44.1
1970  to  1984
Argentina  .05  .023  45.2
Australia  .12  .032  25.7
Canada  .19  .026  13.1
EEC  .12  .022  18.1
United  States  .42  .051  11.9
ROE  .08  .033  41.6
The  estimated  transition  matrix  for  world  trade  in  wheat  is  shown  in
Table  2.  The  F-test  (F=1.44  with  36,144  df)  indicates  that  the  models
estimated  for  the  two  time  periods  are  not  significantly  different at  the  95
percent  level.  Thus,  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  elements  are  the  same  for
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Figure  1.  Market  Shares  of  Major  Wheat  Exporters  in  World  Trade
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TABLE  2.  TRANSITION  PROBABILITIES FOR AGGREGATE  IMPORTS  (1970 TO  1984)
System
Country  Argentina  Australia  Canada  EC  United  States  ROE  R-Square
Argentina  .80  .00  .00  .10  .00  .10
Australia  .34  .00  .00  .00  .16  .50
Canada  .00  .26  .49  .00  .14  .11  .85
EC  .20  .18  .08  .40  .05  .09
United  States  .00  .00  .04  .00  .96  .00
ROE  .59  .00  .00  .00  .04  .37
period  are  presented.  The  relatively  high  R 2  indicates  that  the  Markov  model
provides  a  good  description  of  trade  flows.
The  repeat  purchase  probabilities  indicate  the  proportion  of  market
share  attributable  to  loyalty.  Both  the  United  States  and  Argentina  have
relatively  high  repeat  purchase  probabilities  (.96  and  .80,  respectively),
which  indicates  that  a  large  proportion  of  their  market  shares  is  due  to
loyalty.  About  one-half  of  Canada's  market  share  is  due  to  loyalty,  and  only
40  percent  of  the  EC's  is  due  to  loyalty.  Elements  of  the  matrix  can  be  used
to  derive  a  market  share  equation  for  each  exporter  and  to  indicate  the
proportion  of  market  shares  attributable  to  each  source. 6   Import  loyalty  to
Australia  is  not  significantly  different  from  zero,  indicating  its  market
share  is  composed  almost  totally  of  importers'  switching  from  other  exporters,
primarily  Argentina  and  the  United  States.
Comparison  of  the  off-diagonal  elements  indicates  that  in  most  cases
buyers  are  not  indifferent  between  wheats  from  different  origins.  These
differences  may  be  due  to  indigenous  quality  characteristics  as  well  as
institutional  and  trade  policy  relationships.  In  most  cases  at  least  one  of
the  off-diagonal  elements  is  zero,  which  indicates  the  probability  of
switching  is  zero.  One  exception  is  the  pair  of  transition  probabilities
between  the  United  States  and  Canada  which  indicate  that  while  substitutable,
6 For  example,  the  Canadian  market  share  equation  is
C  AU  C  US  R
MSt  =  .26  MSt_1  +  .49  MSt_1  +  .14  MSt_1  +  .11  MSt-1
where  superscripts  C,  AU,  US,  and  R  stand  for  Canada,  Australia,  the  United
States,  and  Rest  of  Exporters,  and  MS  is  market  share  of  the  exporter.  Thus,
about  one-half  of  the  Canadian  market  share  is  due  to  repeat  purchases,  and
the  balance  comes  from  switching  from  other  exporters.- 11  -
Canadian  wheat  is  a  better  substitute  for  United  States'  wheat  than  vice
versa.7
While  all  countries  compete  directly  and  indirectly,  elements  of  the
transition  matrix  reveal  the  direct  competitors  as  well  as  the  vulnerability
of  a  particular  exporter  to  competition.  The  results  indicate  that  the  United
States  gains  in  market  share  from  Canada  but  loses  to  all  other  exporters
except  Argentina.  Australia  gains  from  Argentina  and  the  United  States  but
loses  to  Canada  and  the  EC.  One  way  to  summarize  this  is  by  summation  of  the
probabilities  of  an  individual  exporter's  gaining  and  losing. 8  In  the  case  of
Australia,  for  example,  the  summed  probabilities  of  gaining  is  1.0  and  that  of
losing  is  0.44.  Thus,  even  though  loyalty  is  nil,  the  summed  probabilities  of
gaining  exceeds  that  of  losing.  Therefore,  Australia  is  not  vulnerable  to
losing  its  market  share.  On  the  other  hand,  the  United  States  is  vulnerable
to  losses  in  market  shares  since  the  summed  probabilities  of  losing  its market
share  exceeds  that  of  gaining.
One  interesting  aspect  of  the  results  is  that  each  country  with
relatively  high  loyalty  (i.e.,  United  States  and  Argentina)  is  vulnerable  to
market  share  losses,  but  those  who  are  not  vulnerable  (i.e.,  Canada,  EC,  and
Australia)  have  relatively  low  loyalty.  Most  desirable  from  an  exporter's
prospective  would  be  to  have  both  a  high  degree  of  loyalty  and  not  be
vulnerable  to  market  share  losses.  Since  no  such  case  exists,  the  results
suggest  that  importers  as  a  group  have  developed  very  effective  buying
strategies  that position  them  advantageously.
The  United  States  and  Australia  represent  two  extreme  cases  among  the
exporters.  The  United  States'  market  share  is  characterized  as  having  a  high
degree  of  loyalty,  but  concurrently,  the  summed  probabilities  of  losing  exceed
those  of  gaining.  One  explanation  for  this  is  that  the  high  loyalty  reflects
differentiation,  reliability,  etc.,  but  the  transition  probabilities  of  losing
market  share  (versus  gaining)  is  an  indication  of  the  residual  supplier
characteristic  of  the  United  States  as  a  wheat  exporter.  Price  support
operations  usually  provide  an  umbrella  for  all  other  exporters,  which  comprise
a  competitive  fringe  that  export  along  individual  excess  supply  functions  and
minimize  carry-out  stocks.  Under  this  market  structure  regular  customers  can
be  lost  due  to  aggressive  competitor  price  and  nonprice  incentives,  and  buyers
switch  away  from  the  United  States  because  of  increased  supply  availability
7The  probability  of  switching  from  the  United  States  to  Canada  (.14)
exceeds  that  of  switching  from  Canada  to  the  United  States  (.04);  this  implies
that  Canadian  wheat  is  more  easily  substitutable  for  the  United  States  than
the  United  States'  wheat  is  for  Canadian  (i.e.,  pairwise  asymmetry).  However,
this  is  likely  not  as  important  in  the  aggregate  as  it  is  in  individual
markets  discussed  below.
8 The  horizontal  summation  is  constrained  by  Equation  6  (Appendix  A)  to
equal  1,  but  the  vertical  summation  is  unconstrained.  Consequently,
comparison  of  the  vertical  summation  to  the  horizontal  summation  indicates  the
relative  probability  of  gaining  or  losing.- 12  -
elsewhere.  That  the  summed  probabilities  of  losing  exceed  that  of  gaining
indicates  the  gradual  erosion  of  the  United  States'  market  share  by  the
competitive  fringe.  The  implication  of  these  results  for  the  United  States  is
that  because  there  is  little  potential  for  increases  in  loyalty,  market  share
can  only  be  increased  or  preserved  by  strategies  that  decrease  the  probability
of  switching  away  and/or  increase  the  probability  of  switching  to  the  United
States.
The  other  extreme  is  that  of  Australia,  which  is  characterized  by  no
loyalty,  but  the  summed  probabilities  of  gaining  exceed  that  of  losing.
Thus,  all  of  Australia's  market  share  is  due  to  switching.  There  are  three
likely  reasons  for  this  distinction.  First,  unlike  other  exporters,  Australia
has  made  limited  use  of  LTAs  and  credit.  Second,  exportable  supply  has  been
volatile  because  Australia  experiences  greater  year-to-year  variability  in
production  compared  to  other  exporters  and  because  stock-carrying  has  been
limited. 9  Third,  major  importers  make  substantial  purchases  from  the  United
States  and  Canada  concurrent  with  their  harvest,  which  precedes  that  of
Australia.  In  conjunction  with  the  second  reason,  importers  would  incur
risk  if  purchases  of  northern  hemisphere  wheat  were  deferred  in  favor  of
Australian  wheat.  At  least  two  of  these  reasons  are  indigenous  and
irresolvable.  Consequently,  Australia's  apparent  aggressive  spot  pricing  to
entice  switching  must  be  an  integral  component  of  their  export  strategy.
These  results  imply  that  Australia  will  have  to  continue  to  be  dependent  on
this  strategy  unless  they  are  capable  of  improving  loyalty.
Results  of  the  Markov  model  can  be  used  to  predict  future  buying
patterns.  The  underlying  assumption  is  that  the  competitive  environment  that
existed  during  the  time  period  that  the  probabilities  were  estimated  remains
constant.  The  results  are  long-run  forecasts  and  represent  the  cumulative
effects  of  the  transition  probabilities.  Results  are  shown  in  Table  3  with
comparisons  to  average  market  shares  (1960  to  1984)  and  actual  values  in  1984.
Argentina,  Australia,  and  the  EC  are  predicted  to  each  gain  market  shares,
Canada  is  predicted  to  remain  constant,  and  the  United  States  to  lose  market
shares.  Conceptually,  in  order  for  an  exporter  to  improve  upon  its  predicted
market  share,  policies  and/or  strategies  must  be  introduced  to  change  the
respective  transition  probabilities.  In  order  to  induce  a  significant  change
in  the  destiny  of  the  United  States'  market  share,  for  example,  a  drastic
change  in  the  structure  of  international  competition  would  be  required.10
9During  the  study  period,  there  were  at  least  two  years  in  which
Australia's  exports  were  significantly restricted  due  to  drought-reduced
production.
1 0Though  there  has  been  recent  domestic  reductions  in  United  States'
export  prices,  (farm  support  prices  decreased  from  365C/bu  in  1983  to  3306/bu
in  1984  and  1985  and  to  2400  in  1986),  the  structural  competitive  environment
will  be  unchanged  if  other  exporters  do  not  reduce  exports,  either  through
reduced  production  or  increased  stockholding.- 13  -
TABLE 3. MARKET SHARE PATHS  FOR WHEAT  EXPORTS
Item  Argentina  Australia  Canada  EC  United  States  ROE
Average:
1960-1984  .05  .13  .21  .10  .41  .10
Actual:
1984  .07  .14  .18  .14  .36  .11
Forecast:
1985  .10  .12  .19  .12  .36  .10
1990  .11  .14  .18  .14  .31  .12
1995  .12  .15  .18  .15  .27  .13
Individual  Countries
Transition  probability  matrices  estimated  for  China,  Japan,  Algeria,
and  the  USSR  are  shown  in  Tables  4 through  13.  Similar  analyses  were
conducted  for  Brazil  and  Iraq,  and  the  results  are  presented  in  Appendix  B.
Testing  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  coefficients  estimated  from  the  different
periods  (1966-80  versus  1970-84)  were  equal  could  be  rejected  only  in  the  case
of  China. 11   In  all  other  cases  the  structure  of  the  transition
probability  matrix  did  not  change  significantly,  and  only  the  results  from  the
most  recent  time  period  are  presented.
Canada  and  the  United  States  are  principal  suppliers  to  China  (Figure  2
and  Table  4)  and  in  recent  years  provided  65  to  75  percent  of  its wheat
imports.  China  imports  CWRS  from  Canada  and  only  one  class,  SRW,  from  the
United  States.  Each  of  the  other  exporters  is  relatively  small,  and  the  ROE
is  comprised  primarily  of  Australia.  Due  to  political  reasons,  the  United
States  first  exported  to  China  in  1972.  Prior  to  this  Canada  was  the  primary
supplier.  Since  then  the  United  States'  market  share  increased  to  63  percent
in  1980  and  then  decreased  to  36  percent  in  1984,  which  was  approximately
equal  to  that  of  Canada.  The  results  (Table  5)  indicate  that  China  displays
reasonable  loyalty  to  each  of  the  two  major  exporters.  The  off-diagonal
transitional  probabilities  between  suppliers  are  not  equal,  indicating
1 1Calculated  F-values  with  degrees  of  freedom  in  parentheses  were:
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Figure  2.  Market  Shares  of  Major  Wheat  Exporters  to  China
I
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TABLE 4. AVERAGE MARKET SHARES  FOR MAJOR WHEAT EXPORTERS  IN  CHINA
Variable  Mean  Standard Deviation  C.V.
1960  to  1984
Canada  .34  .191  56.1
United  States  .15  .212  142.2
ROE  .51  .263  51.6
1970  to  1984
Canada  .42  .179  43.0
United  States  .25  .225  90.5
ROE  .33  .145  43.6
that trade flows are only partially  offset.  In  other words,  China  is  not
indifferent between wheat from  the United States and Canada.  In  particular,
the  1970-84 results  in  the  bottom portion of  Table 3 show that United  States
wheat is  substituted for Canadian wheat, but Canadian wheat is  not  substituted
for  United  States  wheat.  This  is  partly  a result of  the  baking  technology  in
China,  which  does  not  demand  a  high  quality  wheat.  The  transition
probabilities  between  Canada and  the ROE  and between  the United States and  the
ROE  indicate  a  somewhat  higher  degree  of  substitutability.  Comparison  of  the
transition  probability  matrices  for  the  different  periods  indicates  a
TABLE  5.  TRANSITION
AND  1970  TO  1984
PROBABILITIES FOR CHINESE WHEAT  IMPORTS,  1966  TO  1980
Exporter
Country  Canada  United  States  ROE  System  R-Square
1966-1980
Canada  .61  .11  .28
United  States  .21  .77  .01  .36
ROE  .18  .11  .71
1970-1984
Canada  .50  .00  .50
United  States  .09  .65  .26  .51
ROE  .41  .37  .22- 16  -
structural  change  occurred  in  recent  years.  The  nature  of  that  change  is  a
decrease  in  loyalty  and  an  increase  in  switching  probabilities  to  and  from  the
ROE,  which  indicates  increased  diversification.
Japan  buys  primarily  from  the  United  States  and  Canada;  less  than  20
percent  is  bought  from  the  ROE  (Figure  3 and  Table  6).  The  market  share  for
United  States  HRS  has  increased  from  10  percent  in  1971  to  18  percent
recently.  Canada's  market  share  has  experienced  a  long-term  gradual  decrease
from  nearly  40  percent  in  the  early  1960s  to  25  percent  recently.  Multiple
classes  including  HRW,  HRS,  and  White  are  bought  from  the  United  States.  Very
minor  quantities  of  durum  and  soft red  winter  were  imported  and  were  included
in  HRS  and  HRW,  respectively.
The  R-square  is  relatively  high  for  Japan,  indicating  that  the  Markov
model  provides  a good  description  of  Japanese  importing  behavior  (Table  4).
Japan  displays  a  high  level  of  loyalty  for  United  States  wheat,  particularly
HRS  (Table  7).  The  repeat  purchase  probability  for  Canada  equals  zero,
indicating  complete  dependence  on  switching,  in  this  case,  from  United  States
HRW.  This  result  follows  from  Canada's  long-term  declining  market  share  in
Japan.  The  off-diagonal  elements  indicate  limited  or  no  switching  between  the
different  wheats,  and  where  switching  does  occur,  Japan  is  not  indifferent.
These  results  indicate  that  switching  does  not  take  place  between  Canadian
CWRS  and  United  States  HRS  despite  their  technical  similarities.  Important
transition  relations,  however,  do  exist between  Canadian  CWRS  and  United
States  HRW,  which  are  less  technically  similar.  The  differences  in
probabilities  indicate  that  in  the  Japanese  market  Canadian  wheat  is  a better
substitute  for  United  States  HRW  than  vice  versa,  which  would  be  expected.
TABLE 6. AVERAGE MARKET SHARES  FOR MAJOR WHEAT
JAPAN
EXPORTERS AND CLASSES  IN
Variable  Mean  Standard  Deviation  C.V.
1960  to  1984
United  States  HRW  .23  .058  25.4
United  States  HRS  & D  .10  .064  61.5
United  States  White  .19  .048  25.3
Canada  .27  .052  19.3
ROE  .21  .100  48.8
1970  to  1984
United  States  HRW  .237  .014  5.8
United  States  HRS  & D  .146  .026  18.0
United  States  White  .197  .030  15.2
Canada  .245  .026  10.6
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Figure  3.  Market  Shares  of Major  Wheat  Exporters  /  Classes  to  Japan- 18  -
TABLE  7.  TRANSITION  PROBABILITIES  FOR  JAPANESE  WHEAT  IMPORTS,  1970  TO  1984
Exporter/Class
United States
Country  Canada  HRS  HRW  White  ROE  System R-Square
Canada  .00  .00  1.00  .00  .00
U.S.  HRS  .00  .77  .00  .03  .20
U.S.  HRW  .39  .00  .45  .06  .10  .89
U.S.  White  .19  .00  .00  .37  .44
ROE  .00  .61  .39  .00  .00
There are two  possible  explanations for  these observations.  First, the
large Japanese  trade  surplus with the  United States  puts political  pressure  on
the  Japanese  Food  Agency  to  purchase  United  States  wheat.  Second,  by  having  a
cheap,  viable  alternative  such  as  United  States  HRW,  Japan  is  in  a  better
position  to  negotiate  terms when purchasing wheat from other  sources  (e.g.,
Canada),  which  are  often  procured  in  private negotiation.
Of all  of  the  countries examined  in  this  study,  the results  of  the
Markov model  for Japan  are  somewhat peculiar,  as described above.  In order to
investigate  the  behavior  of  market  shares  in  Japan,  a  simple  correlation  matrix
is  shown in  Table 8.  The  results  indicate  there  are  few  significant
correlations  between market shares  and either current market shares  or  lagged
market shares.  Most notable  is  that  the  correlation between Canadian market
shares and  lagged market shares  for  the other exporter/classes  are  all  small
and insignificant.  Also,  those for  the United States  HRW market share  and
lagged market shares  of  other exporter/classes are  small  and  insignificant.
Simple bivariate regressions  between market shares of Canadian wheat, United
States HRS,  and United  States  HRW  and  corresponding  lagged values are shown in
Table 9.  The  results indicate  that, in  the  case  of  United States HRS,  the
TABLE 8.  SIMPLE CORRELATIONS FOR  EXPORT MARKET SHARES  IN  JAPAN,  1970  TO  1984
Current Market Shares  Lagged Market Shares
United States  United States
Canada  HRS  HRW  White  ROE  Canada  HRS  HRW  White  ROE
Canada  1.0*  -. 61*  .04  .02  -. 27  -. 29  .27  .17  .10  -. 11
U.S.  HRS  -. 61*  1.0*  -. 25  .09  -. 23  .08  .03  -. 44*  -. 03  .10
U.S.  HRW  .04  -. 25  1.0*  .05  -. 24  .25  -. 35  -. 18  -. 08  .16
U.S.  White  .02  .09  .05  1.0*  -. 82*  .10  -. 43  -. 27  -. 01  .29
ROE  -. 27  -. 23  -. 24  -. 82*  1.0*  -. 02  .25  .44  -. 01  -. 26
*indicates  significantly different than  zero at the  10%  level.- 19  -
TABLE  9.  ALTERNATIVE REGRESSION MODELS FOR EXPORTER MARKET SHARES  IN  JAPAN,  1970
TO  1984
Int.  Canada  US  HRW  US HRW  US WHITE  Other  R2  F  DW
Dependent  (MSt)
Canada
.315  -.29  .08  1.7  1.70
(4.80)  (1.08)
.205*  .27  .07  1.02  1.94
(514)  (1.01)
.165  .34  .03  .42  2.55
(1.34)  (.64)
.227  .09  .01  .14  2.43
(4.68)  (.36)
.257  -. 07  .01  .16  2.51
(8.31)  (.40)
US  HRS
.299*  -.63*  .38  7.96*  1.21
(5.49)  (2.82)
.14  .03  .00  .03  2.58
(3.38)  (.10)
.225*  .08  .01  .10  1.45
(1.81)  (.16)
.13*  .07  .05  .74  1.44
(2.72)  (.31)
.17*  -.15  .00  .01  1.64
(5.52)  (.86)
US  HRW
.204*  .13  .06  .89  2.43
(5.00)  (.94)
.26*  -. 19  .12  1.85  2.79
(12.87)  (1.36)
.279  -.18  .03  .43  1.82
(4.28)  (.66)
.244  -. 04  .01  .08  2.28
(9.48)  (.28)
.227*  .05  .03  .37  2.25
(13.98)  (.60)
1) t-ratios in parenthesis  and *  indicates  significant at the  10%  level- 20  -
lagged  Canadian  market  share  is  significant  but  negative  and  the  regression  is
significant.  In  all  other  cases  the  lagged  market  share  is  not  significantly
different  from  zero,  and  the  F-value  indicates  the  regression  is  not
significant.  These  results  indicate  that  when  lagged  market  shares  are
analyzed  from  a  bivariate  perspective  they  generally  have  very  little
influence  on  current  market  shares  in  the  case  of  Japan,  which  is  somewhat
consistent  with  the  results  of  the  transition  matrix.
The  primary  wheat-based  product  produced  in  Algeria  is  couscous,  which
is  made  from  durum  wheat  imported  almost  exclusively  from  Canada  and  the
United  States  (Figure  4 and  Table  10).  Algeria  is  the  largest  importer  of
this  type  of  wheat  and  has  maintained  an  LTA  with  Canada  since  the  early
1970s.  The  results  are  shown  in  Table  11  and  indicate  that  import  loyalty  for
United  States  and  EC  wheat  is  estimated  to  be  high  relative  to  that  of  Canada.
Algeria  appears  to  be  indifferent  between  United  States  and  Canadian  wheat.
In  fact,  this  is  the  only  case  in  which  the  switching  probabilities  were  both
relatively  large  and  nearly  offsetting.  The  probability  of  transferring
purchases  from  the  EC  to  the  United  States  is  zero.  In  spite  of  this,  Algeria
has  been  an  important  recipient  of  the  Export  Enhancement  Program  of  the
United  States,  which  is  intended  to  expand  export  sales.  These  results
indicate  that  if  the  structure  of  competition  is  unchanged,  this  program  would
be  ineffective  in  increasing  the  United  States'  market  share.
Prior  to  1972,  the  USSR  purchased  wheat  almost  exclusively  from  Canada.
Since  a  1972  change  in  domestic  policy,  significant  quantities  have  been
purchased  from  the  United  States,  but  the  United  States  market  share  has  been
volatile  (Figure  5 and  Table  12).  In  1980  there  was  an  embargo  on  United
States  wheat  sales  to  the  USSR,  and  the  United  States  market  share  decreased
TABLE  10.  AVERAGE MARKET  SHARES FOR MAJOR WHEAT  EXPORTERS IN  ALGERIA
Variable  Mean  Standard Deviation  C.V.
1960  to  1984
Canada  .19  .161  82.3
United  States  .48  .179  37.6
EEC  .20  .163  81.2
ROE  .13  .097  75.9
1970  to  1984
Canada  .30  .115  38.4
United States  .41  .133  32.3
EEC  .16  .121  74.0
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Figure  4.  Market  Shares  of  Major  Wheat  Exporters  to  Algeria
I
ro- 22  -
TABLE  11.  TRANSITION  PROBABILITIES FOR WHEAT  IMPORTS  BY  ALGERIA,  1970 TO  1984
Exporter
Country  Canada  U.S.  EC  ROE  System  R-Square
Canada  .19  .39  .31  .41
U.S.  .42  .58  .00  .00  .66
EC  .18  .00  .50  .32
ROE  .05  .01  .51  .44
from  35  to  20  percent  but  subsequently  increased  to  35  percent  in  1981.  Since
1974  increased  purchases  have  been  made  from  Argentina.  The  USSR  maintains
LTAs  with  each  of  the  major  exporting  countries.  Despite  the  effects  of  the
United  States  grain  embargo,  the  F-test  indicates  the  transition  matrix  was
not  significantly  different  in  the  most  recent  period.
The  USSR  exhibits  strong,  and  approximately  equal,  loyalty  to  each  of
the  exporters  (Table  13),  which  illustrates  the  effect of  diversifying  supply
sources.  This  strategy  allows  the  USSR  to  avoid  being  dependent  on  selected
exporters  and  to  take  advantage  of  multiple  sources  of  supply.  If  the  United
States  gains  in  this  market,  it  is  primarily  from  Canada,  but  it  loses  to  all
exporters  by  about  the  same  magnitude.  Canada  gains  from  the  United  States
and  Argentina  but  loses  primarily  to  the  United  States.  The  offsetting
probabilities  are  not  symmetrical,  indicating  that  the  USSR  is  not  indifferent
between  sources.  In  particular,  United  States  wheat  is  a  better  substitute
for  Canadian  wheat  than  vice  versa,  and  Canadian  wheat  is  a  better  substitute
for  Argentine  wheat  than  vice  versa.  None  of  the  exporters  are  noticeably
TABLE  12.  AVERAGE MARKET  SHARES  FOR MAJOR WHEAT  EXPORTERS IN  THE  USSR
Variable  Mean  Standard Deviation  C.V.
1960  to  1984
Canada  .41  .305  73.6
United  States  .22  .233  104.9
Argentina  .08  .094  118.4
ROE  .27  .265  97.0
1970  to  1984
Canada  .35  .243  69.0
United  States  .34  .214  62.6
Argentina  .11  .091  84.0












60  62  64  66  68  70  72  74  76  78  80  82  84
Year
*  Canada  United States  *  Argentina  A  Other
Figure  5.  Market  Shares  of Major  Wheat  Exporters  to the  USSR
C1~3- 24  -
TABLE  13.  TRANSITION  PROBABILITIES  FOR  RUSSIAN  WHEAT  IMPORTS,  1970  TO  1984
Exporter
Country  Canada  U.S.  Argentina  ROE  System  R-Square
Canada  .61  .11  .28  .00
U.S.  .28  .65  .00  .07  .53
Argentina  .00  .11  .68  .21
ROE  .12  .10  .06  .72
vulnerable  to  market  share  losses  in  the  USSR  market.  In  each  case  the  summed
probabilities  of  gaining  appoximately  equals  those  of  losing.  The  elements  of
the  transition  matrix,  being  nearly  all  nonzero,  illustrate  that  the  USSR  is
highly  diversified  in  its  importing  activities.  By  exhibiting  relatively
strong  and  approximately  equal  loyalty  to  each  exporter,  the  USSR  is  in  an
advantageous  strategic  position,  given  the  highly  political  nature  of  the
grain  trade.
Conclusion
The  purpose  of  this  paper  was  to  provide  a  long-term  analysis  of
importer  purchasing  patterns  and  exporter  competition.  Transition
probabilities  were  estimated,  which  are  descriptive  of  importer  loyalty  and
the  probability  of  switching  between  exporters.  The  estimated  transition
matrices  provide  a  good  description  of  purchasing  behavior  in  world  trade  and
in  several  individual  country  markets.  The  results  from  the  world  trade  model
displayed  greater  loyalty  and  less  switching  between  wheats  of  different
origins  than  did  similar  models  estimated  for  individual  countries.  Thus,
there  is  more  intense  competition  observed  in  individual  markets  than  in  the
world  market  as  a  whole.  Wheat  was  found  to  be  clearly  nonhomogeneous  in
international  trade,  indicating  that  buyers  are  not  indifferent  between  wheats
of  different  origins.  With  few  exceptions,  purchase  flows  in  one  direction
were  not offset  by  flows  in  the  opposite  direction.  This  result  was  expected,
but  in  several  important  cases  (e.g.,  Japan)  there  was  limited  or  no  switching
between  wheat  classes  that  were  technically  very  close  substitutes.
The  results  depict  the  United  States  as  an  exporter  vulnerable  to
market  share  erosion.  Import  loyalty  is  relatively  high,  but  concurrently,
the  summed  probability  of  losing  market  share  exceeds  that  of  gaining.  These
results  suggest  the  United  States  has  played  a  residual  supplier  role  in  the
international  wheat  market.  Unless  significant  changes  are  instituted,  the
United  States'  market  share  will  gradually  decline;  Canada's  will  remain
constant,  and  that  for  the  EC,  Argentina,  and  Australia  will  increase.
Importers  were  observed  to  have  different  characteristics  regarding
diversification.  China  displayed  increased  diversification  during  the  study
period.  The  USSR  has  displayed  strong  loyalty  to  each  of  the  major  suppliers
and  has  displayed  purchasing  behavior  in  which  switching  between  exporters  is
very  evident.  On  the  other  hand,  Japan,  while  being  very  diversified  in  the
traditional  sense,  exhibits  very  limited  switching  between  exporters.APPENDIX A
Model  Specification  for  Estimation  of
the  Transition  Probability  Matrix- 27  -
The  underlying  conceptual  and  empirical  model  for  estimating  the
elements  of  the  transitional  probability  matrix  are  described  here  briefly.
The  joint  probability  for  two  events,  Si  and  Sj,  can  be  defined  as  follows:
(1)  Pr(Si,  Sj)  = Pr(Si)  *  Pr(SjlSi)
where  Pr(Si,  S.)  is  the  joint  probability  for  events  Si  and  Sj,  Pr(Si)  is  the
marginal  probaBility  for  Si,  and  Pr(SjISi)  is  the  conditional  probability  for
an  outcome  Sj  when  the  other  outcome  ?Si)  is  given.  When  Sj  is  assumed  to  be
an  outcome  in  time  t  (Xt)  and  Si  is  that  in  time  t-1  (Xt-.),  the  joint
probability  for  Xt  and  Xt-1  is  expressed  as
(2)  Pr(Xt,  Xt-1)  =  Pr(Xt-1)  * Pr(XtlXt-1)
where  Pr(Xt,Xt-1)  and  Pr(XtlXt-1)  are  the  joint  and  the  conditional
probabilties,  respectively.  Pr(Xt-1)  is  the  marginal  probability  for  Xt-i.
Aggregating  both  sides  of  Equation  2  over  Si  (Xt-1)  gives
n
(3)  Pr(Xt)  =  z Pr(Xt-1)  Pr(XtlXt-1)
i=1
n
or  (4)  qj(t)  =  Z  qi(t-l)  Pji
i=1
where  qj(t)  and  qi(t-1)  represent  unconditional  probabilities  Pr(Xt)  and
Pr(Xt .i, respectively.  Pj-  is  the  conditional  probability  for  Xt,  given  Xt-1
[ie  Pr(XtXt-i)],  Pji  is  a so  known  as  the  transition  probability  for  an
outcome  in  t  when  the  other  outcome  was  given  in  t-1.  Equation  4 is  the
Markov  Probability  Model.  Pji  in  Equation  4 satisfies  the  following
conditions:
(5)  0 < Pji  <  1.0
n
(6)  E  Pji  =  1.0
i=1
If  qj(t)  and  qi(t-1)  are  replaced  with  actual  observed  proportions
Yj(t)  and  Yi(t-1),  respectively,  Equation  4  can  be  rewritten  including  an
error  term  as
n
(7)  Yj(t)  =  E  Yi(t-1)  Pji  +  ej  (t)  j  =  ,  2,  . . .,  n
i=1
The  stochastic  assumptions  for  ej  are  E(e)  =  0 and  E(e'e)  =  S.  The  transition
probabilities,  Pii,  are  estimatea  from  sample  data.  Telser  used  an  ordinary
least  squares  estimator  to  estimate  Pji-  The  estimator,  however,  does  not
guarantee  that  the  estimated  transition  probabilities  satisfy  the  conditions
stated  in  Equations  5  and  6.  Telser  suggested  an  ex  post  subjective- 28  -
adjustment  procedure  to  correct  the  transition  probability  estimates  falling
outside  of  the  zero-to-one  interval.  Lee,  Judge,  and  Takayama;  and  Theil  and
Rey  subsequently  suggested  an  inequality-restricted  estimator  based  on  a
quadratic  programming  algorithm.  The  objective  of  the  inequality-restricted
estimator  is  to  minimize  the  sum  of  squared  errors  as
n  n




(9)  Pji  =  1.0  for  all  j
i=1
and
(10)  Pji  >  0.0
Equation  8 is  in  quadratic  form  in  terms  of  transition  probabilities.
The  transition  probability  matrix  estimated  in  this  study  used  the
inequality  quadratic  estimation  programming  technique  developed  by  Lee,  Judge,
and  Zellner.  Market  shares  (proportion)  of  each  exporter  or  class  in  the
world  wheat  market  were  used  as  variables  in  Equation  7.  Based  on  the  Markov
model,  the  market  share  of  the  jth  brand  in  time  t  is  a function  of  market
shares  of  all  other  brands  in  time  t-1.APPENDIX  B
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Figure  BI.  Market  Shares  of  Major  Wheat  Exporters  to  Brazil- 32  -
TABLE  B1.  AVERAGE MARKET SHARES FOR  MAJOR WHEAT  EXPORTERS  IN  BRAZIL
Variable  Mean  Standard Deviation  C.V.
1960  to  1984
Canada  .17  .201  117.7
United  States  .50  .129  25.0
ROE  .33  .203  61.9
1970  to  1984
Canada  .28  .186  65.3
United States  .50  .147  28.1
ROE  .22  .175  80.8
TABLE  B2.  TRANSITION  PROBABILITIES  FOR  WHEAT  IMPORTS  BY  BRAZIL,  1970  TO  1984
Exporter  System
Canada  United  States  ROE  R-Square
Canada  .33  .37  .30
United  States  .42  .57  .01  .30
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Figure  B2.- 34  -
TABLE  B3.  AVERAGE MARKET SHARES FOR MAJOR WHEAT EXPORTERS  IN  IRAQ
Variable  Mean  Standard  Deviation  C.V.
1960  to  1984
Canada  .16  .221  135.3
United  States  .20  .246  122.2
Australia  .45  .253  56.0
ROE  .18  .265  145.3
1970  to  1984
Canada  .18  .130  71.5
United  States  .21  .227  106.8
Australia  .41  .179  43.5
ROE  .19  .246  126.9
TABLE  B4.  TRANSITION  PROBABILITIES  FOR  WHEAT  IMPORTS  BY  BRAZIL,  1970  TO  1984
Exporter  System
Canada  United  States  Australia  ROE  R-Square
Canada  .51  .46  .00  .03
United  States  .07  .12  .05  .76  .41
Australia  .00  .39  .61  .00
ROE  .39  .01  .35  .25- 35  -
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